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IS THE GENEVA POW CONVENTION "QUAINT"?
R. J. Delahuntyt
The straightforward answer to this question is No. The Third
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
("POW Convention")' is a legally binding document which virtually all
the nations of the world have ratified and which is foundational in the
Law of War. It is undoubtedly applicable to interstate armed conflicts,
whether declared wars or not, such as the 1980-88 War between Iran and
Iraq, the 1982 Falkland Islands War between Great Britain and
Argentina, and the First and Second Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003
between the United States-led coalitions and Iraq. Equally, the POW
Convention is applicable to civil wars, which have become the dominant
form of armed conflict since the Convention was ratified in 1949.2 In
the event of a future interstate armed conflict, such as a war between
India and Pakistan, the POW Convention would regulate the status and
treatment of military personnel captured by either belligerent.
The mote vital question, then, is not whether the POW Convention
is "quaint," but whether it should be modernized to meet the conditions
f Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law,
Minneapolis, MN. B.A., Columbia summa cum laude; B.A., Oxon. First class honours;
B. Phil. Oxon.; J.D., Harvard School of Law cum laude. I would like to thank my friends
and colleagues Curtis Gannon, A. John Radsan, and John C. Yoo for their valuable
comments. I am responsible for any errors that remain.
1. Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Altogether, there are four 1949 Geneva
Conventions. The First is the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; the Second is the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces, adopted
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; and the Fourth is the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Only the Third and Fourth Conventions are in question in
this essay.
2. In 2001, Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg found that of the total of
111 conflicts recorded for the period 1989-2000, only seven were interstate, while
ninety-five were intrastate. Another nine intrastate conflicts were accompanied by
foreign intervention. See Peter Wallensteen & Margareta Sollenberg, Armed Conflict,
1989-2000, 38 J. PEACE RESEARCH 629, 632 (2001).
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of early twenty-first century warfare. 3 Here, not unexpectedly, opinions
will differ.4 In the fifty-eight-year history of the POW Convention, calls
for change have not been infrequent. During the 1960s and 1970s, for
instance, many Third World countries argued that the POW Convention
reflected the circumstances of warfare found in Europe in the mid-
twentieth century, but was poorly adapted to the needs and modes of
operation of guerrilla fighters in wars of decolonization and "national
liberation." 5 That argument contributed to the widespread (although not
universal) adoption of two new "Additional Protocols" to the Geneva
Conventions in 1977:6 Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I specifically
sought to extend the coverage of the POW Convention to "armed
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and aainst racist regimes in the exercise of their right
of self-determination." Given that most of the international community
3. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions were themselves designed to update an
earlier set of conventions, including the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2021, relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. The State Department's letter to the
Senate, submitting the 1949 Conventions for its advice and consent to ratification, said
that "[i]n the light of experiences of World War II, there was recognized by all
governments the urgent necessity for rather extensive revisions of the [earlier]
conventions for the purpose of bringing them up to date ....... Message from the
President of the United States Transmitting Copies of the Geneva Conventions for the
Protection of War Victims, Senate Executives D, E, F, and G, 82d Cong., 1 st Sess. (Apr.
26, 1951), at A3. There is nothing immutable about the 1949 Conventions, as their own
origin shows.
4. Compare, e.g., Thomas E. Ayres, "Six Floors" of Detainee Operations in the
Post-9/1J World, Parameters 33 (Autumn 2005), available at
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/05autumn/ayres.htm, with Steven R.
Ratner, Are the Geneva Conventions Out of Date?, L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Summer
2005, at 66, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/Newsandlnfo/
LQN/summer2005/ratner.pdf. See also William H. Taft, IV, The Eighteenth Waldemar
A. Solf Lecture in International Law, 184 MIL. L. REv. 174, 178 (2005) ("[T]he fight we
are engaged in with al Qaeda does not fit the historical model of an armed conflict for
which the Geneva Conventions were designed").
5. See W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of
Privileged Combatants Under the Geneva Protocol of 1977 concerning International
Conflicts, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4, 6-10 (1978). See also Alfred B. Rubin, The
Status of Rebels Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 21 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 472,
481 (1972).
6. Protocol Additional (No. 1) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional (No. 2) to
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
7. The United States has ratified the second of these two Protocols, but
consciously decided not to ratify the first of them. The State Department has, however,
determined that certain provisions of Protocol I are customary international law. See
1636 [Vol. 33:5
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agreed almost thirty years ago that the POW Convention required
significant modernization to fit the realities of (then) contemporary
conflict, it would hardly be remarkable if the phenomenon that some
scholars of military affairs call "the new war"' 8 should also require
commensurable changes. After all, none of the drafters of the
Convention in 1949 could have anticipated the emergence of a form of
warfare between States on the one side and, on the other, transnational
terrorist organizations that had global reach, were capable of waging war
at a level of violence and lethality comparable to those of interstate
conflicts, sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction and were
prepared to use them against civilian centers, operated through highly
decentralized and clandestine networks, relied on combatants who
Michael J. Matheson, Continuity and Change in the Law of War: 1975 to 2005:
Detainees and POWs, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 543, 545-46 (2006).
[T]here was considerable controversy in the 1970s concerning non-
conventional conflicts and irregular fighters, and in the end some significant
changes to previous [Geneva] law were included in the Additional Protocols...
. Some of the provisions of the Protocol [I] were rejected outright [by the
United States] on the grounds that they unduly favored irregulars and terrorists,
and would endanger the civilian population among whom such persons might
attempt to hide. This included Article 1(4), which defined so-called wars of
national liberation as international conflicts, and article 44, which recognized
combatant and POW status for irregulars who [in certain crucial respects] failed
to distinguish themselves from the civilian population .... Yet, the Reagan
Administration supported various other provisions of Additional Protocol I and
accepted that they were either already a part of customary law or should
become so.
Id. See also Letter of Transmittal from President Reagan, to the U.S. Senate, Agora: The
U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of
War Victims, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910 (1987); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Rationale for the
U.S. Decision, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1988); Michael J. Matheson, The United States
Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 420-21
(1987).
8. See, e.g., HERFRIED MUNKLER, THE NEW WARS (2002) (Patrick Camiller trans.,
2005); MARY KALDOR, NEW & OLD WARS: ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN A GLOBAL ERA
(2001 ed.); MARTIN VAN CREVELD, ON FUTURE WAR (1991); Vincent J. Goulding, Jr.,
Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare, Parameters, Winter 2000-01, at 21-30,
available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/ 00winter/goulding.htm. I
would note that other students of military affairs disagree, some arguing that the
phenomenon of war is disappearing, see JOHN MUELLER, THE REMNANTS OF WAR (2004),
and others maintaining that interstate wars are likely to reappear with some frequency,
see COLIN S. GRAY, ANOTHER BLOODY CENTURY: THE BATTLE FOR THE TWENTY FIRST
CENTURY (2006). For a brief overview of some aspects of the controversy, see MAX
BOOT, WAR MADE NEW: TECHNOLOGY, WARFARE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 1500 TO
TODAY 471-73 (2006). See also MARTIN SHAW, THE NEW WESTERN WAY OF WAR: RISK-
TRANSFER WAR AND ITS CRISIS IN IRAQ 52-70 (2005) (developing typologies for past and
present forms and modes of warfare).
2007] 1637
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purposefully did not distinguish themselves from civilians, had no
identifiable territorial base and were not responsible for protecting any
local population, and (in the view of some analysts) were not pursuing
any of the traditional political objectives characteristic of rebels,
insurgents, resistance fighters, or national liberation movements.
9
Before attempting to evaluate whether the POW Convention needs
to be revised to accommodate conflicts of this novel kind, however, we
must start with a basic understanding of the Convention and the
interpretative problems to which it has given rise. Although almost any
characterization of the POW Convention's provisions will provoke
objections, the description in Part I below can hopefully serve as a
roadmap. Part II will briefly discuss some of the objections to the
government's position on the POW Convention. In particular, it will
consider the position of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) and some advocacy groups that the concept of "unprivileged" or
"unlawful" combatancy has no place in the Convention system, and the
accompanying view that the POW Convention and the Fourth (Civilian)
Convention are seamless, in the sense that persons not protected by the
POW Convention must be protected by the Civilian Convention.' 0 Part
III considers the Supreme Court's rulings on the government's position
in the Hamdan case, and Congress's swift and emphatic decision to
reverse the Court legislatively. Finally, Part IV returns to the original
question, whether the POW Convention stands in need of modernization.
It offers both a proposal for consolidating the ongoing reform of the
Convention system and a means for pursuing further efforts at reform.
I.
The POW Convention embodies three critical distinctions: between
kinds of conflicts; between levels of protection; and between kinds of
combatants.
First, the POW Convention differentiates between two kinds of
conflict: those governed by Article 2, and those governed by Article 3.
Article 2 refers, in effect, to interstate or international wars or other
9. See FAISAL DEVJI, LANDSCAPES OF THE JIHAD: MILITANCY, MORALITY,
MODERNITY (2005) (arguing that al Qaeda has "ethical" rather than "political" aims).
10. For the ICRC's position, see HELEN DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE
FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 397 (2005). Some advocacy groups have also
adopted this position, e.g., the Petitioners in the Supreme Court of Israel case, H.C.
769/02, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 5 (Dec. 11, 2006), translation
available at http://elyonI.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/a34/ 02007690.a34.htm.
11. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
1638 [Vol. 33:5
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armed conflicts between States, and adopts a functionalist (as opposed to
formalist) approach by including undeclared as well as declared wars.12
By contrast, Article 3 (often called "Common" Article 3, because it is
found in all four Conventions) refers to armed conflicts "not of an
international character" (emphasis added) that "occur[] in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties" to the Convention. What is
operationally a single armed conflict can in some cases be legally
bifurcated into an Article 2 conflict and an Article 3 conflict: thus, for a
period, the United States treated the War in Vietnam as an Article 2
conflict insofar as it concerned the States of North and South Vietnam
(the latter of which was being assisted by the United States), and as an
Article 3 conflict insofar as it concerned the Viet Cong forces in South
Vietnam. 13
Article 3's reference to non-international armed conflicts within the
territorial boundaries of a State Party is, perhaps designedly, somewhat
opaque.14 It is safe to say, however, that Article 3 was intended to cover
internal (as opposed to interstate) wars, and was addressed primarily,
perhaps entirely, to civil wars or insurgencies, such as the heavily
internationalized Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, which the Convention's
drafters had lived through and which unquestionably influenced their
work, 15 and the Chinese Civil War of 1927-50 and Greek Civil War of
1944-49, both of which were ongoing as the Convention was being
drafted. 16
In four ways, the text of Article 3 supports a reading that confines
its application to such internal or civil wars.
i) Article 3 distinguishes Parties to the Convention from Parties "to
12. See James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in
International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 313, 317 (2003).
13. See Rubin, supra note 5, at 479.
14. See Stewart, supra note 12, at 318.
15. See Robert Kolb, Le droit international public et le concept de guerre civile
depuis 1945, 105 RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES 9 (2001).
16. Article 3 may also have been intended to reach wars of colonial rebellion (or, as
they came to be called, wars of national liberation). See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR & LAW
SINCE 1945 177 (photo reprint 2002) (1994); Franqois Bugnion, The Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949: From the 1949 Diplomatic Conference to the Dawn of the New
Millennium, 76 INT'L. AFF. 41, 44 (2000). However, in the years that ensued, Great
Britain refused to concede the applicability of Article 3 to such conflicts in Kenya,
Malaya, and Cyprus, and France, at least for a period, denied the applicability of Article 3
to the conflict in Algeria. See Tom Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts:
Toward the Definition of "International Armed Conflict", 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 52-54
(1971). Additional Protocol I was designed in part to cure this uncertainty.
2007] 1639
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the conflict": the former term would naturally be understood to
include the State whose de jure government had formally ratified
the Convention, while the latter term would include the opposing
side in the internal conflict which, as a mere claimant to
governmental authority, could not have represented a State
"Party" to the Convention.
ii) Article 3's coverage is limited to certain armed conflicts
"occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties. " Unlike most interstate conflicts, civil wars and
national insurgencies are ordinarily fought out entirely within the
territorial boundaries of the nation at war (allowing for some
spillover, such as naval conflicts between government and rebel
forces in international waters).
iii) Article 3 is also limited to armed conflicts "not of an
international character." The distinction between "international"
and "non-international" conflicts was deeply engrained in
Western legal thought before 1949, and indeed goes back to
Antiquity. The conduct of civil war by the de jure government
affected was traditionally considered to be a purely internal or
domestic matter, and thus outside the purview of international
lawmaking. 18  Equally, since rebels and insurgents were
considered not to be subjects of international law, their manner
of waging war was also thought to be beyond the reach of
international regulation. 19  Pre-1949 international conventions
accordingly did not embody rules for the humanitarian regulation
of civil war: the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, for instance,
applied solely to international warfare. Even now, the Rome
17. See STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 250 (2005) ("In Western
thought, there was a long tradition of regarding civil conflict as fundamentally different
from true war .... Concretely, this meant that none of the rituals associated with war-
making and war-waging was applicable to struggles against mere lawbreakers. Nor did
the rules on the conduct of war apply.").
18. See Kolb, supra note 15; Stefan Oeter, Civil War, Humanitarian Law and the
United Nations, I MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF UNITED NATIONS L. 195, 197-98, 200 (1997).
19. Indeed, it remained problematic well after 1949 how rebels or insurgents could
be bound by Article 3. See, e.g., Note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of
Prisoners of War in Vietnam, 80 HARV. L. REv. 851, 856-58 (1967).
20. NEFF, supra note 17, at 367 ("Not until 1949 ... were rules on the waging of
civil strife embodied in international conventions, and even then only in a very
rudimentary fashion.").
1640 [Vol. 33:5
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Statute of the International Criminal Court perpetuates a form of
the international/non-international distinction. 2 1  Article 3's
extension of even modest international humanitarian standards to
some aspects of "non-international" war thus represented, for the
time, a significant departure from legal tradition.
22
iv) Finally, Article 3's last clause states that "[t]he application of the
preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the
Parties to the conflict." In the official commentary on the
Convention by the ICRC, Jean Pictet emphasized that this
language was designed to accommodate the fears of States that
by agreeing to extend even minimal legal protections to their
opponents in a civil war, they would implicitly be recognizing,,. , ,,23
their legal status as "belligerents" or "insurgents. The
understanding that Article 3 was to apply to civil war and
insurgency-and not, accordingly, to all possible forms of armed
conflict not covered by Article 2-has long been dominant
among scholarly commentators,2
4 including Pictet. 25
21. See Stewart, supra note 12, at 321. For an explanation of the traditional legal
doctrines of recognition of "belligerency" and "insurgency," see David A. Elder, The
Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, 11 CASE
W. J. INT'L L. 37, 38-41 (1979). Roughly, by recognizing the "belligerent" status of the
parties to a civil war, a foreign State held those parties to be entitled to the full rights of
war (as in an interstate conflict), and assumed all the obligations of the law of neutrality
as between them. Recognition of belligerency was not, however, tantamount to the
recognition of the insurgents as an independent State. Recognition of insurgency was a
truncated form of recognition of belligerency: it did not trigger the application of the law
of neutrality but it did entail treating the insurgents as belligerents within the boundaries
of the country in which the civil war was occurring. "Within the territory of the afflicted
country, ... insurgency and belligerency had much the same effect. The most obvious
one was that captured insurgents were entitled to treatment as prisoners of war rather than
as criminals, at least during the continuance of the hostilities." NEFF, supra note 17, at
269.
22. Even after Article 3 had become settled law, its applicability to some aspects of
civil war remained disputed. For example, "[t]he relationship between the opposition and
the forces of a state intervening on behalf of the established government creates a[n]...
ambiguous legal situation" under that provision. W. Michael Reisman & James Silk,
Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict?, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 466 (1988).
23. Pictet wrote: "This clause is essential. Without it Article 3 would probably
never have been adopted. It meets the fear that the application of the Convention, even to
a very limited extent, in cases of civil war may interfere with the de jure Government's
suppression of the revolt by conferring belligerent status, and consequently increased
authority and power, upon the adverse Party." Jean Pictet, Commentary, Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590006?OpenDocument.
24. See, e.g., Oeter, supra note 18, at 201-03 ("Instead of extending the legal rules
for international armed conflict to 'non-international armed conflicts,' as originally
2007] 1641
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Second, the POW Convention affords two different levels of
protection for those whom it covers. Combatants in international, Article
2 conflicts, if they satisfy the qualifications laid out in Article 4, are
legally entitled to POW status, which effectively includes all the
substantive protections in the Convention. Thus, e.g., although their
captors may interrogate them on any matter whatsoever, they are "bound
to give only [their] surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and
army, regimental, personal or serial number or, failing this, equivalent
information." Art. 17(1). Further, "[p]risoners of war who refuse to
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment of any kind." Art. 17(4). By contrast,
captured combatants in non-international, Article 3 conflicts are not
intended by the ICRC, the negotiators developed their own body of rules specifically
adapted to civil war situations. This separate body of rules took the form of a minimum
standard [in Article 3] that restricts the freedom of states to use force against civil war
opponents by guaranteeing a series of safeguards for wounded, prisoners and members of
the civilian population .... What is regulated by common Article 3 is not the behavior of
states (or contracting parties) in their reciprocal relationship, but the behavior of states in
their own sphere of jurisdiction."); Dietrich Schindler, Significance of the Geneva
Conventions for the Contemporary World, 836 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 715 (1999),
available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/57JQ6T ("Article 3 common
to the four Conventions constitutes a kind of human rights provision; it regulates the
relationship between governments and their own nationals in the event of an internal
armed conflict."); ERIK CASTRtN, CIVIL WAR 85 (1966) ("[Common Article 3] would be
valid in a civil war, in insurrections, and in other internal disturbances in which it is not
merely a question of riot, disorder or minor demonstrations, but where a warlike situation
which the police forces are unable to quell has arisen. The Article has special
significance in civil wars and uprisings where the insurgents have not been recognized as
belligerents, since after such recognition the insurgents may avail themselves of all
belligerency rights."); see also G.I.A.D. DRAPER, REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICTS 108 (1998); Joyce Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 26 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 294, 300 (1949).
25. See Pictet, supra note 23 ("Speaking generally, it must be recognized that the
conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with 'armed forces' on either side
engaged in 'hostilities'-conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an
international war, but take place within the confines of a single country."). Further,
Pictet's commentary on Article 3 also enumerates a "list ...of a certain number of
criteria on which the application of the Convention would depend." These criteria plainly
assume that Article 3 refers to civil war or domestic insurgency. For instance, the first
criterion is:
That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized
military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate
territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the
Convention.
And Pictet's fourth criterion includes these elements:
(a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the
characteristics of a State.
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over the
population within a determinate portion of the national territory ....
1642 [Vol. 33:5
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legally entitled to the status of POWs. 26 Rather, they are legally entitled
only to the modest (if indefinite) protections specifically enumerated in
Art. 3(1)-(4)-in effect, to treatment in accordance with the bedrock
humanitarian principles of the POW Convention. The plain language of
Article 3 supports this conclusion: it states that parties to the conflict
"should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present
Convention." By necessary implication, the "other provisions" of the
POW Convention are not applicable (except by "special agreement")
when Article 3 applies.
Third, the POW Convention distinguishes-not in express terms,
but by necessary implication-between two different kinds of
combatants. Article 4 lays down a set of detailed requirements that must
be met before a captive qualifies legally for POW status. These
requirements, which derive from Article I of the 1899 Hague
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, are
designed to maintain and protect the distinction, fundamental to the Law
of War, between combatants and civilians. Simplifying somewhat,
captured combatants are only legally eligible for POW status under the
Convention 27 if they satisfy four tests: they must i) be commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates; ii) have a fixed, distinctive
emblem recognizable at a distance; iii) carry arms openly; and iv)
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
Article 4(A)(2)(a)-(b).
28
It is obvious that some combatants-perhaps even including
members of a Party's regular armed forces-will not satisfy all of these
cumulative requirements, and hence will not qualify for POW status. For
example, an undercover operative for the CIA who engaged in conflict in
Afghanistan against the Taliban would not be entitled to POW status if
he was captured while not wearing "a fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance." 2 9 Likewise, a regular U.S. Army officer who infiltrated
26. See Stewart, supra note 12, at 320 ("[T]here is no requirement in ... Article 3
... that affords combatants prisoner-of-war status in non-international armed conflicts.").
27. As indicated above, the requirements under Additional Protocol I are more
relaxed.
28. Persons need not, however, be members of the regular armed forces of a party
to the conflict in order to qualify for prisoner of war status: they may also include certain
persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members of them (such
as war correspondents); certain crew members of the merchant marine or civil aviation;
and certain combatants in the levee en masse.
29. Note, however, that "[t]he codified law of war for international armed conflict
does not prohibit the wearing of a non-standard uniform. It does not prohibit the wearing
of civilian clothing so long as military personnel distinguish themselves from the civilian
2007] 1643
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behind enemy lines in the Afghan War as a military spy, and who failed
to carry his weapons openly, would also be ineligible for POW status.
30
If these combatants are captured by the enemy in an Article 2 armed
conflict, they must therefore fall outside the protections of the
Convention (including those of Article 3, which refers only to non-
international conflicts.) At best, if "any doubt" arises as to their legal
status, they may enjoy the Convention's full protections "until such time
as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal." POW
Convention, Article 5. If no "doubt" has arisen about their status, or if a
competent tribunal has determined that they do not fall within any of the
categories of Article 4, then they fall outside the Convention. The
drafters of the Convention devoted some attention to this matter, but
reasonable readers can disagree over the interpretation of that evidence in
the negotiating record. 31
Combatants in an Article 2 conflict who do not satisfy the tests of
Article 4 and who therefore do not qualify for POW status are widely
considered to be "unlawful" or "unprivileged" combatants. In the War in
Afghanistan, the United States government took the position that
although the POW Convention was indeed applicable to its conflict with
the Taliban under Article 2, captured Taliban combatants were not
entitled to POW status because they failed to meet all the requirement of
Article 4 (specifically, the requirements of wearing a fixed distinctive
emblem and of fighting in accordance with the laws of war). 32 Thus, in
population, and provided there is legitimate military necessity for wearing something
other than standard uniform. The generally recognized manner of distinction when
wearing something other than standard uniform is through a distinctive device, such as a
hat, scarf, or armband, recognizable at a distance." W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear
of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 493, 542 (2003).
30. To be sure, the requirements have to be interpreted reasonably: if a U.S. Marine
was captured while sleeping in his tent-and so not "carrying arns"--he would not
therefore be disqualified from being a POW.
31. For a review of the relevant travaux prparatoires from the ICRC's viewpoint,
see Knut D6rmann, The Legal Situation of "Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants", 85
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 45, 56-58 (2003), available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5LPHBV.
32. Accord YORAM DrNSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 47-50 (2004)("In light of close scrutiny of the war in
Afghanistan by the world media-and, in particular, the live coverage by television of
literally thousands of Taliban troops before and after their surrender-it is undeniable
that, whereas Taliban forces were carrying their arms openly (condition (iii)), and
possibly meeting other conditions of lawful combatancy, they did not wear uniforms nor
did they display any other fixed distinctive emblem (condition (ii)). Since the conditions
are cumulative, members of Taliban forces failed to qualify as prisoners of war under the
customary international law criteria. These criteria admit of no exception, not even in the
unusual circumstances of Afghanistan as run by the Taliban regime .... The legal
1644 [Vol. 33:5
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the government's view, the captured Taliban were unlawful or
unprivileged combatants.
A second kind of unlawful or unprivileged combatant will exist if
there are armed conflicts that do not fall under either Article 2 or Article
3-that is, that are neither international wars nor non-international wars
occurring within the territory of a State Party to the Convention. The
United States government took the position that its conflict in
Afghanistan with al Qaeda forces was of this kind. That is, the conflict
against al Qaeda was not an Article 2 armed conflict, primarily for the
reason that al Qaeda is not a State and could not be a treaty party.
33
Further, the government argued, the conflict with al Qaeda did not fall
under Article 3, because it was neither a civil war nor other internal
conflict covered by that article. Consequently, in the government's view,
al Qaeda captives from the War in Afghanistan were also outside the
protections of the Convention. 
34
position seems singularly clear to the present writer."). See also Raymund T. Yingling &
Robert W. Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393, 402 (1952)
("While the conditions imposed by the convention for treatment as prisoners of war of
members of resistance movements would not have covered many persons acting as
'partisans' during World War II, nevertheless, it is believed that such conditions are the
minimum necessary if regular forces are to have any protection against attacks by the
civilian population and if any distinction is to be made between combatants and
noncombatants. The farmer by day, assassin by night, type of 'partisan' cannot be
condoned by international law, whatever other justification circumstances may give
him."); Michael C. Dorf, "What Is an 'Unlawful Combatant,' and Why It Matters: The
Status of Detained al Qaeda and Taliban Fighters ", (Jan. 23, 2002), available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
dorf/20020123.html.
33. Accord Military Prosecutor v. Kassem (Israel, Mil. Ct. 1969), excerpted in
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 806
(Marco Sass6li and Antoine A. Bouvier eds., 1999) (rejecting claim that combatant
belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, despite wearing military
dress and carrying a military pass when captured, was entitled to protection under Third
Geneva Convention as a prisoner of war):
We agree that the Convention applies to military forces (in the wide sense of
the term) which, as regards responsibility under International Law, belong to a
State engaged in armed conflict with another State, but it excludes those
forces-even regular armed units-which do not yield to the authority of the
State and its organs of government. The Convention does not apply to these at
all. They are to be regarded as combatants not protected by the International
Law dealing with prisoners of war ....
See also Judith Tucker, The Prisoners of Israel, MERIP Reports, No. 108/109, The
Lebanon War (Sept.-Oct. 1982), at 55-57 (noting that Israel refused to grant POW status
to Palestinian prisoners captured in 1982 War in Lebanon).
34. The government's conclusions were embodied in a Memorandum from the
President to the Vice President et al., Subject: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees, February 7, 2002, available at http://www2.gwu.edu/
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 1 27/02.02.07.pdf [hereinafter "Humane Treatment
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II.
The category of "unprivileged" or "unlawful" combatants was by no
means invented by government lawyers during the current
Administration, as some critics have mistakenly asserted.3 5 On the
contrary, the category is well entrenched in the customary Law of War,
and was not superseded by any of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 36 As
William Howard Taft, IV, the then-Legal Advisor to the State
Department, wrote in 2003, "the law of armed conflict itself disqualifies
some fighters and categories of people seeking to fight from claiming
certain privileges. But this is precisely what the law calls for, and it is a
validation of long-standing elemental principles of the law of armed
conflict, in particular distinguishing privileged from unprivileged
belligerency. Even legal scholars who disagreed with the
Administration's application of the Convention to the Afghan conflict,
including Professor Adam Roberts of Oxford University, firmly
emphasized the continued existence of this category of combatants. 
38
To be sure, under the traditional Law of War (even after the 1949
Memorandum"].
35. John Bellinger, the current Legal Adviser to the State Department, has written
that he "frequently hear[s] the charge in Europe and elsewhere that this term ['unlawful
enemy combatants'] has no basis in national or international law, and I fear that this has
become conventional wisdom among critics of U.S. policy. In fact, the distinction
between lawful and unlawful enemy combatants (also referred to as 'unprivileged
belligerents'] has deep roots in international humanitarian law, preceding even the 1949
Geneva Conventions . . . and this distinction remains to this day." [Opinio Juris], John
Bellinger, Unlawful Enemy Combatants (posted Jan. 17, 2007), available at
http://lists.powerblogs.com/ pipermail/opiniojuris/2007-January/001 111 .html.
36. See, e.g., Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
37. William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient
Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 320 (2003). Referring to al Qaeda, Mr. Taft went on
to say: "Terrorists are belligerents who lack the entitlements of those legitimately
engaged in combat. No colorable argument has been put forward that terrorists are
entitled to any special status under the law of armed conflict - and certainly not to the
status of prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention. ... It is of fundamental
importance that Article 4, consistent with the maxim expression unius est exclusio
alterius, imposes a distinction between the legitimate and the illegitimate combatant...
The purposes of the law of armed conflict are not advanced by granting illegitimate
fighters immunity for their belligerent acts .. " Id. at 320-21.
38. See, e.g., Adam Roberts, The Prisoner Question; If the U.S. Has Acted
Lawfully, What's the Furor About?, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2002, at BI ("On the key
question of whether there can be a category of detainee not qualifying for POW status, a
press officer of the [ICRC] has been quoted as saying that the concept of an 'unlawful
combatant' does not exist under international law. This is simply wrong. True, it is
impossible to find the term 'unlawful combatant' in any treaty. But the concept of
'unlawful combatant,' or something very like it, is implicit in the definitions of unlawful
combatants that appear in the key treaties.").
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Conventions), the protections that attached to a captured unlawful
combatant were few. In his seminal 1952 work on the subject of
unlawful combatancy, R. R. Baxter explained that
[t]he correct legal formulation is ... that armed and unarmed
hostilities, wherever occurring, committed by persons other
than those entitled to be treated as prisoners of war or peaceful
civilians merely deprive such individuals of a protection they
might otherwise enjoy under international law and place them
virtually at the power of the enemy .... International law
deliberately neglects to protect unprivileged belligerents
because of the danger their acts present to their opponents.
3 9
Perhaps taking Baxter's broad references to international law at face
value, critics of the Administration have also claimed that its legal
position created a legal "black hole" into which al Qaeda and Taliban
prisoners could disappear. Again, they are mistaken. In the years since
Baxter wrote, general international law-if not the 1949 Convention
itself-has developed in ways that afford basic humanitarian protections
even to unlawful combatants. Foremost among these developments
stands the 1984 Convention Against Torture, which applies not only to
governments' treatment of their own nationals, but also to the captivity
of all lawful or unlawful combatants in their hands.40 Other provisions
of international law are also applicable. 4 1 Although the United States
has not ratified Additional Protocol I of 1977, it has designated certain
provisions of that treaty as customary international law. Among these is
Article 75 of that Protocol, which embodies a set of core humanitarian
protections for "persons who are in the hands of a Party to the conflict" if
those persons are "affected by a situation referred to in Article 1 of this
Protocol." These protections arguably apply as a matter of customary
law (if not of conventional or treaty law) to all prisoners from the War in
Afghanistan. 42  Further, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has
39. Richard R. Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerrillas,
and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 343 (1952).
40. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 463, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
41. See Taft, supra note 37, at 321 ("Certain minimum standards apply to the
detention of even unprivileged belligerents-they are not 'outside the law.' Terrorists
forfeit any claim to POW status under the laws of armed conflict, but they do not forfeit
their right to humane treatment .... The customary law of armed conflict innovated a
structure to deal with the situation of persons-like terrorists-who fall into 'enemy'
hands without meeting the basic criteria of Article 4 of the [POW Convention].").
42. See id. at 322 ("While the United States has major objections to parts of
Additional Protocol I, it does regard the provisions of Article 75 as an articulation of
safeguards to which all persons in the hands of the enemy are entitled."). The express
restriction of Article 75 to "a situation referred to in Article 1 of this Protocol" should,
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opined that Article 3 of the 1949 Convention itself now constitutes a rule
of customary international law. 43  That ruling could afford a basis in
customary international law for extending the Article's protections to
unlawful combatants from any kind of armed conflict, including those
not reached directly by the Convention. Finally, the so-called "Martens
Clause" of the 1899 Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War
on Land 44 might conceivably be invoked as a basis for protection.
The critics who claim that the Administration's position on the
POW Convention created a legal "black hole" are, therefore, mistaken.
International law, both through the Torture Convention and as a matter of
custom, affords basic humanitarian protections to every variety of
captured unlawful combatant. True, some writers, including the present
one, have argued that the President is not constitutionally bound to
comply with the requirements of customary international law.4 5 But that
conclusion does not reach the United States' treaty obligations.
Furthermore, even if the President has the constitutional power to
override customary international law (as assumedly embodied in Article
3 of the POW Convention), there is nothing to indicate that he has in fact
done so. On the contrary, on February 7, 2002, the President issued a
Directive ordering the United States Armed Forces, "as a matter of
policy... [to] continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent
with the principles of Geneva." 46 While there is certainly play in the
however, be noted. Article 1 of the Protocol refers to armed conflicts covered by Article
2 of the 1949 Convention, as expanded to include wars of national liberation and the like.
Strictly, therefore, Article 75 may reach only Taliban captives, not al Qaeda members.
As against this, however, one might argue that the al Qaeda captives are at least "affected
by" an Article 2 conflict- viz., the United States' conflict with the Taliban.
43. See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27).
44. That Clause, introduced by the Czarist diplomat Professor von Martens, is
located in the Preamble to the treaty and states: "Until a more complete code of the laws
of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under
the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the
usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the
requirements of public conscience." The Martens Clause has reappeared in later treaties,
but has no generally accepted meaning. See Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and
the Rules of Armed Conflict, 317 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 125 (1997), available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/
siteengO.nsf/html/57JNHY.
45. See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Executive Power v. International Law,
HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2007).
46. Memorandum from President George W. Bush, re Humane Treatment of
Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), at 2, 3, available at
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joints of this language, it could reasonably have been read as an order to
the military to extend Article 3 protections to the unlawful combatants in
their hands. In a memorandum of July 7, 2006, the Department of
Defense apparently read it to have had that effect. 47  Indeed, despite
being unilateral, the President's Directive might even have been
considered, under the ICJ's ruling in Nuclear Test Case (Australia &
New Zealand v. France),48 to constitute a binding obligation under
international law.
Unlawful combatants, in short, do not fall into a legal "black hole."
Although not legally entitled to protection solely by reason of the
Convention itself, they are otherwise protected both by conventional and
customary international law, as well as by the Presidential Directive. In
one respect, however, the Administration's critics do have a valid point.
The Presidential Directive and the later Defense Department
memorandum applied in terms only to the United States Armed Forces.
The CIA was not covered by those orders. The absence of any reference
to the CIA could not, of course, absolve that agency from any obligations
it had under international law, including the Torture Convention and
(insofar as it is considered to be customary international law) Article 3 of
the POW Convention. But it did mean that the CIA operated under
fewer legal constraints than the Defense Department on the domestic
side.
49
III.
So far we have proceeded without reference to the Supreme Court's
opinion last summer in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case, which overturned
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White House/bushmemo_20020207_ed.pdf.
47. In a memorandum dated July 7, 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon
England instructed "all DoD personnel [to] adhere to these standards [in common Article
3]. In this regard, I request that you promptly review all relevant directives, regulations,
policies, practices, and procedures under your purview to ensure that they comply with
the standards of Common Article 3." Deputy Secretary England's memorandum also
stated that, apart from the military commission procedures reviewed in Hamdan,
"existing DoD orders, policies, directives, executive orders, and doctrine comply with the
standards of Common Article 3 and, therefore, actions by DoD personnel that comply
with such issuances would comply with the standards of Common Article 3." See Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments,
July 7, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/genevaconsmemo.pdf.
48. 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
49. The question of the CIA's possible liability under domestic criminal law for
some of the actions it is thought to have committed against al Qaeda or Taliban captives
is illuminatingly discussed in A. John Radsan, The Collision Between Common Article
Three and the Central Intelligence Agency, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
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part of the government's legal position. Congress acted swiftly and
decisively to overturn the Court in the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA). 5I We must now consider both that Court's opinion and
Congress's subsequent decision to overrule it.
Hamdan was an al Qaeda combatant of Yemeni nationality who had
been captured in November 2001 during the hostilities in Afghanistan
and who was detained in Guantanamo awaiting trial on war crimes
charges before a military commission. Hamdan did not deny that he was
an enemy combatant. He sought judicial relief in a habeas petition
claiming that the military commission before which he had been charged
lacked the authority to try him. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected Hamdan's petition. 52 All three members of the court agreed in
ruling that the Convention was not judicially enforceable and that
Hamdan was therefore not entitled to relief. Further, the majority
opinion for the court discussed and accepted the proposition that "the
1949 Convention does not apply to al Qaeda and its members." 53 The
majority's opinion on the scope of the Convention, including the
inapplicability of Article 3, was joined by then-Judge John Roberts, who
was soon after to be appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
In a 5-3 opinion written by Justice Stevens (Chief Justice Roberts
was recused because of his participation in the appeal below), the
Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision. In the part of his
opinion most relevant here, Justice Stevens left undecided the question
whether the Convention was inapplicable in its entirety to Hamdan
because al Qaeda is not a State Party to it. 54 But Justice Stevens did
decide that Article 3 applied to Hamdan's case.55  Justice Stevens
reasoned that the "conflict not of an international character" to which
Article 3 referred was distinguishable from the kind of conflict referred
to in Article 2 "chiefly because it does not involve a clash between
nations (whether signatories or not)." 56 For Justice Stevens, "[t]he term
'conflict not of an international character' is used [in Article 3] in
contradistinction to a conflict between nations." 57  In reaching that
50. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
51. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
52. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
53. Id. at 41.
54. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795. As discussed further below, however, the Court's
ruling that Article 3 covered the al Qaeda captives appears to necessitate the conclusion
that the remainder of the POW Convention does not apply to them.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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conclusion, Justice Stevens rejected the government's view that Article 3
was not intended to be a catch-all that established standards for any and
all armed conflicts not included in Article 2.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, disagreed with the
majority's ruling regarding Article 3. (Justice Alito, while dissenting,
did not reach that issue.) Noting that the Court's own precedents
required it to give "great weight" to the President's interpretation of that
treaty clause, Justice Thomas reasoned that "[t]he President's
interpretation of Common Article 3 is reasonable and should be
sustained."' 58 Further, Justice Thomas observed:
The Court does not dispute the President's judgments
respecting the nature of our conflict with al Qaeda, nor does it
suggest that the President's interpretation of Common Article 3
is implausible or foreclosed by the text of the treaty. Indeed,
the Court concedes that Common Article 3 is principally
concerned with "furnish[ing] minimal protections to rebels
involved in ... a civil war," precisely the type of conflict the
President's interpretation envisages to be subject to Common
Article 3.59
Specifying the precise holding of Hamdan as to the scope of the
Convention is not altogether easy. The Court plainly did not hold that
the any provisions of the Convention other than Article 3 were
applicable to al Qaeda captives. In view of the breadth of the Court's
language, however, it appears to have held that all al Qaeda captives are
entitled to all Article 3 protections.
Hamdan undoubtedly represented a setback for the government; but
how much of one? The Court was in error analytically about the
applicability of Article 3. It signally failed to do justice either to the
textual considerations mentioned in Part I above or to the extensive
scholarly interpretation-including that of the ICRC--of that text. It
gave no discernible meaning to the language of Article 3 that confined
that provision's application to armed conflicts internal to "the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties." It ignored evidence from the
negotiating history, including the Conference's rejection of a proposal by
the Italian delegation that would have made the Convention's basic
58. Id. at 2846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (citation omitted).
60. See Michael N. Schmitt et. al, The Manual on the Law of Non-International
Armed Conflict: With Commentary 1 (2006) ("Non-international armed conflicts [do not]
encompass conflicts extending to the territory of two or more States."). The United
States' armed conflict against al Qaeda since 9/11 was fought out in both the United
States and Afghanistan.
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humanitarian principles applicable "at any time and in all places," i.e., to
all non-international conflicts. 6 1  It also ignored State practice under
Article 3, including, e.g., a Belgian judicial decision holding Article 3
inapplicable to armed conflict among various Somali militia groups. 62 It
failed to consider the possibility that the scope of Article 3's reference to
armed conflicts "not of an international character" coincides with that of
Additional Protocol II, which is intended to "develop[] and supplement
Article 3" of the Convention, and which is limited only to such conflicts
on the territory of a High Contracting Party as involve both that Party's
armed forces and "dissident armed forces or other organized armed
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a
part of [the High Contracting Party's] territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement"
Additional Protocol 11.63 And, as Justice Thomas pointed out, it refused
to follow its own precedent in giving deference to the executive in a case
in which treaty language admitted of different but reasonable• • 64
interpretations. (Professors Posner and Vermeule have castigated the
Court's approach to this last issue as "lawless." 65)
That said, does Hamdan's mistaken view of Article 3 really make a
significant practical difference to the government's treatment of the
captives from the War in Afghanistan? As far as the Armed Forces go,
Hamdan should not have made any material difference, at least if the
President's February 7, 2002 Directive and subsequent Defense
Department instructions had been faithfully implemented: treatment that
the Court held to be a matter of legal entitlement should have been
accorded in any event as a matter of Presidential policy. The Court's
61. For the language of that proposal and an analysis of its intended effects, see
Elder, supra note 21, at 45-46.
62. Centre pour l'6galit des chances et la lutte contre le racisme v. C... et B...,
Military Court (Dec. 17, 1997), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/0/
C6907DE3C449DEA541256641005C6D00.
63. Additional Protocol II, supra note 6, art. 1(1). Concededly, the threshold for
applying Additional Protocol II is widely considered to be higher than that for Common
Article 3; but a comprehensive and convincing treatment of the Common Article 3 would
at least have considered that question.
64. Justice Thomas should have pressed his point even harder. Not only did the
Court fail to give deference to the executive's construction of the treaty, but it did give
deference to the ICRC's interpretation of it. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796. Judicial
deference to the executive's interpretation of a treaty has constitutional underpinnings,
and reflects the executive's constitutional primacy in foreign affairs; deference to the
construction of a non-governmental relief organization has no such constitutional
foundation.
65. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 271 (2007).
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decision might have made a difference to the treatment of captives in the
hands of the CIA, which was not covered by the President's Directive;
but as to that, we can only speculate.
66
Moreover, as Professor Kenneth Anderson has noted, Hamdan's
holding on Article 3 appears to entail some remarkable consequences
that should be welcome to the government. 6 7 First, given that the Court
ruled that the conflict with al Qaeda was "not of an international
character," it follows directly that that conflict is not an "international"
conflict under Article 2; and since the other protections of the
Convention are applicable only in international conflicts, al Qaeda
captives necessarily get no Convention protections other than the
minimal ones specified in Article 3. As is frequently said, Article 3 is in
itself a Convention in miniature; and those who enjoy its protections in
non-international conflicts cannot enjoy the full Convention protections,
which are tied solely to Article 2, international conflicts. (Remember
that the text of Article 3 demonstrates elsewhere that when it applies, the
other provisions of the POW Convention do not: that is why "special
agreements" are needed in Article 3 situations to bring "all or part of the
other provisions" into effect.)
Second, if the United States is bound to accord Article 3 treatment
to al Qaeda captives, then al Qaeda, whether it consents or not, is bound
to accord the same treatment to captured U.S. military personnel: the
obligations are symmetrical. Accordingly, Article 3(l)(d)'s requirement
that al Qaeda captives, if tried at all, must be tried "by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" would be satisfied if
the United States provided the same kind of courts and judicial
procedures that al Qaeda would provide in trying U.S. defendants-
assuming that al Qaeda could meet the minimum standards here.
Third, as Anderson points out, it seems to follow also that al Qaeda
captives cannot be entitled to the general protections of the Civilian
Convention, because those protections too are applicable only in Article
2, international armed conflicts. 68 As noted above, the ICRC, along with
66. See Radsan, supra note 49, for discussion of press and other reports of CIA
activities.
67. See Kenneth Anderson's Law of War and Just War Theory Blog, Hamdan,
Geneva Conventions, and Common Article Three, July 12, 2006 (updated September 17,
2006), http://www.kennethandersonlawofwar.blogspot.com/2006/07/hamdan-geneva-
conventions -and-common.html.
68. To be more precise: the general protections of the Civilian Convention, other
than those that are to be implemented in peacetime or during an occupation, apply only to
conflicts of the kind mentioned in Article 2 of that Convention, which here coincides
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some legal scholars and activists, rejects the notion of unlawful
combatancy. The ICRC instead takes the position that the POW
Convention and the Civilian Convention are seamless, in the sense that
persons not protected by the POW Convention must be protected by the.... 69
Civilian Convention. Thus, on the ICRC's view, it appears that if
Osama bin Laden is not a POW, he must be a civilian, entitled to all the
protections that the Civilian Convention affords to persons with that legal
status, subject only to the limited "derogations" permitted under Article 5
of that Convention. Hamdan implicitly rejects that (grotesque)
conclusion. 70
with Article 2 of the POW Convention. Article 3, which is common to both the POW
and Civilian Conventions, thus provides the exact measure of legal entitlements of these
captives under the Conventions.
For this reason, Article 4(1) of the Civilian Convention is not applicable to these
captives. That clause states that "[p]ersons protected by the [Civilian] Convention are
those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in the case
of a conflict ... , in the hands of a Party to the conflict ...of which they are not
nationals." Despite the breadth of this language, the clause only comes into play in the
case of an international, Article 2 conflict. Hamdan implies that this jurisdictional
requirement is not met in the case of the U.S. conflict with al Qaeda.
69. The ablest presentation of this view of which I am aware is in Dormann, supra
note 31. A summary treatment is found in JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE
ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 57-58 (2006). Note that there is in any case a
"nationality" exclusion under Article 4(2) and (3) of the Fourth Convention.
70. Even the more nuanced view that al Qaeda terrorists should be considered to be
"civilians" when they are not "directly" taking part in hostilities is unsound, and has
rightly been rejected by the United States. In Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v.
Israel, the Supreme Court of Israel came to a different conclusion, rejecting the Israeli
government's claim that "people who take active and continuous part in an armed
conflict . . . should be treated as [unprivileged] combatants . . . and .. .do not enjoy
[either] the protections granted to civilians ... [or] the rights and privileges of [lawful]
combatants, since they do not differentiate themselves from the civilian population, and
since they do not obey the laws of war." Supra note 10, at 27. The Israeli Court relied
on Art. 51(3) of Additional Protocol I, which codifies the view that unprivileged
combatants are civilians "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."
Although Israel is not a party to that Protocol, the Israeli Court viewed the provision as
customary international law, see id. at 30, which was therefore directly incorporated
into the domestic law of Israel, see id. at 20.
The United States, which (like Israel) is not a party to Additional Protocol I, does
not accept the view that Article 51(3) states customary law, and (unlike Israel) would not
incorporate the provision into its domestic law even if it were so. Moreover, treating al
Qaeda (or other) transnational terrorists as "civilians" except when they are taking a
"direct part in hostilities" enables them to shift opportunistically between "combatant"
and "civilian" status. This effect would substantially weaken the protections that the Law
of War affords for peaceable civilians. Thus, if terrorists were free to pose as civilians
when it served their purposes, but also retained the right to act as combatants when they
chose to do so, the regular forces opposing them would have powerful incentives to view
all enemy civilians as potential terrorists, and hence to treat them harshly. Indeed, the
United States refused to ratify Additional Protocol I because (among other reasons) it had
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Hamdan's implicit rejection of the ICRC's view concerning the
applicability of the Civilian Convention may prove to be a signally
important consequence of that decision. In effect, Hamdan seems to
preserve the doctrine of unlawful belligerency, which has been one of the
key conceptual elements of the government's legal strategy. Moreover,
in the wake of Hamdan, Congress has enacted the MCA, which
explicitly affirms and codifies that doctrine. Before returning to the
question whether the Convention should be modernized, we must briefly
consider the MCA.
The MCA was, in substance, a Congressional decision to override
the Hamdan decision by legislation. Of greatest relevance here, the
MCA gutted one of the core holdings of Hamdan by expressly
authorizing the President to establish military commissions for the
prosecution of offenses committed by "unlawful enemy combatants"-a
term defined to include "a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or
associated forces.", 7' Further, the MCA specifically provided that "[n]o
alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by [these] military
commission ... may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of
rights. 72  The MCA also provided that "[n]o person may invoke the
Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or
other civil action or proceeding to which the United States... is a party
as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or
territories."7 3 In effect, then, the MCA makes all four of the Geneva
Conventions-including Common Article 3-unenforceable either by
the courts in civil cases or by the military commissions. Further, the
MCA confirmed the President's authority with respect to treaty
interpretation. It stated: "As provided by the Constitution and by this
section, the President has the authority for the United States to interpret
the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions." 74 Rarely can
a Supreme Court decision have been so swiftly, massively and stingingly
rejected by the political branches as Hamdan was.75
From the point of view advocated in this paper, Congress's
determination to define and codify the concept of "unlawful enemy
combat"-surely an exercise of Congress's constitutional power to
such perverse effects. See discussion supra note 7.
71. 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a (1)(A)(i) (West 2006).
72. Id. § 948b (2)(g) (West 2006).
73. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 note (West 2006).
74. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 note (West 2006).
75. The constitutionality of the MCA has recently been upheld by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Boumediene v. Bush, No. 05-5062 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 20, 2007).
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define and punish offences against the Law of Nations 76-is critical: at
least as far as the domestic law of the United States is concerned, there is
such a legal category, and any argument that the Geneva Conventions do
not recognize that category has little practical effect. Further, the MCA
delineates, with far more detail and precision than Article 3, exactly what
kinds of courts and judicial processes are to be furnished to the unlawful
enemy combatants within the statute's definition. Whatever one thinks
about the sufficiency of those processes, the MCA makes an essential
contribution to the Law of War by specifying standards that the
Convention left inchoate and uncertain.
IV.
Finally, I turn very briefly to the question from which this paper
started: Does the POW Convention require modernization? In one
respect, it appears to this writer that the answer must be Yes. The POW
and Civilian Conventions, taken together, do not in express terms
recognize the customary law category of unlawful combatancy. True, it
is generally accepted that the category survived the adoption of the
Conventions and has remained applicable to certain combatants in
certain types of armed conflict; but the omission of any reference to it in
the treaty texts themselves has caused considerable uncertainty and may
lead to the mistaken inference that combatants who are not POWs must
therefore be considered civilians. Although the ICRC and some
advocacy groups may endorse that inference, to the present writer it
seems not only unwarranted from a legal point of view but also appalling
from a humanitarian point of view.
The objective of the Conventions is and should be to protect
honorable combatants who conduct themselves in accordance with the
Laws of War on the one hand and peaceable civilians on the other, not
terrorists who deliberately target civilian populations for death. To
regard Osama bin Laden as an ordinary civilian, with a right to all the
protections that civilian status entails, because under the standards of the
POW Convention he is not entitled to the status of a POW, would be a
travesty of law and of justice. 77
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
77. Equally, it would be a travesty to treat bin Laden as a civilian "unless and for
such time as [he] take[s] part in hostilities." Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, art.
51(3). Among many other perverse implications of that view, the leadership of al Qaeda,
which does not usually expose itself to the hazards of combat, would be more likely to be
considered "civilians" than the organization's operatives, who do more often assume
such risks.
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Realistically, there is no chance whatever of a new international
convention or protocol codifying the customary law category of unlawful
combatancy and providing standards for the treatment of unlawful
combatants when captured. Nonetheless, national legislation like the
MCA can accomplish much that cannot feasibly be done at present by
treaty. Nations like the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia
and Israel should coordinate efforts, based on their own unfortunate
experiences with transnational terrorism, to frame legislative provisions
that prescribe how their governments can deal with situations of unlawful
combatancy in ways that are at once just, effective, and humane.
Moreover, the process of formulating standards should be primarily
legislative and political, rather than judicial: as Judge Richard Posner has
argued, the Justices have "scant knowledge" of security issues, and
Congress, which knows far more about such matters, is more likely to
perform an "effective checking function" on overstated executive
claims. 78 Careful attention should also be given to refining the concept
of unlawful combatancy, perhaps by distinguishing terrorists who select
civilians as their principal targets from guerrillas or other kinds of
combatants who target military objectives and attack civilians only
collaterally. 79 Steady, piecemeal reform of the Convention system is
best accomplished through the legislative processes of the democratic
nations that the post-9/1 1 phenomenon of mass terrorism has put at the
greatest risk.
78. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 150 (2006).
79. See Ayres, supra note 4, at 11-12.
2007] 1657
23
Delahunty: Is the Geneva POW Convention "Quaint"?
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 5 [2007], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss5/6
